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Okay, so I get that the main section of the bill requires companies which provide encryption to decrypt data upon receiving a court order demanding access to it. If the company is capable of decrypting its customers' data, that's a scary thought.
But it's followed by two very conflicting subsections: (b) nothing in this act may be construed to require or prohibit any specific design or operating system to be adopted by any covered entity, but (c) a provider of remote computing services to the public shall ensure such products are capable of complying with a court order to decrypt.
It seems like this could be read as "you must build backdoors", but also as "we're not telling you how to architect your product." These two sections are completely at odds.
By the way, Scribd sucks. Have a downloadable PDF: https://josephhall.org/f0eabaa89b8ee38577bf7d0fd50ddf0d58ecd... (it's still just non-OCR'd images though :<)
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EDIT
The community can down vote but can't respond to the truth.
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Talk here is fine, but it's more useful to let folks on the hill know what's up.
I think the bill is over-the-top bad; they are obviously going for a compromise of some kind. By appearing to reach a middle ground they can paint the pro-crypto camps as being uncooperative.
Of course, there's no middle ground with math.
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There was a report of someone speeding. Use the awesome government powers to subpoena cell phone connectivity, credit card transactions, or whatever to identify the speeder.
Police have auctions for seized stuff, presumably you could just auction off that data off to recover the costs (and then some)
Then repeat, over and over.
If you're feeling really enthusiastic, start targeting aws's DOD stuff. [1]
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If this passes and five years later computer security is swiss cheese, politicians know that most people will blame the computer companies and vendors not the government.
If this fails due to tech company opposition, they will get to avoid any criticism for not preventing the next terrorist attack. Instead they will simply find one encrypted iPhone and blame Apple.
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All thoughts on civil liberties aside, it's sad that these officials don't even realize that what they're asking for is (or will hopefully shortly be) impossible for companies to do.
Then the real fighting will start. I'm sure Congress sees this proposal as a middle-ground between DOJ desires and freedom/privacy, but once it dawns on them that things like "no knowledge" encryption are really what it says on the tin, they will feel backed into a corner, with the only visible choices being something asinine like, criminalize encryption or ... give up?
Maybe that's something for this community to start thinking about, if we want to have a constructive say in this whole mess. Come up with a way to frame the "Give up" option in a better light, so Congress can point to it and tell the DOJ "look we did X for you", while still not outlawing encryption.
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Obviously there's no financial incentive for any of this.
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How can we stop this...Vote! Vote the people that support this out of office.
....also...If they want to make everything unsecure...hack the congress members bank accounts, private information, Ashley Madison account, every email and text they send, every phone call they make...every password they've used on any site ever. Make them wish they never made such a stupid law. Maybe then they will learn how important encryption is.
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Not the first time: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiana_Pi_Bill
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If your company ever has any way to view the data, the government will find a way to force you to give it to them.
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[0] http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4534017/ns/technology_and_science-...
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What would we do if this passed? I suppose I would winnow and chaff the hell out of my data, sending literally 42 gigabytes of garbage bytes for every one-kilobyte file. That way, if somebody wants to decrypt it, they will at least have to sift through tons and tons of garbage to do so.
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It seems to say that if a company can read their customers data in plain text, then that plaintext should also be provided to authorities upon request/warrant.
So the bottom line is: use strong crypto and build products with strong crypto and ensure only the end users hold the keys to the data. Then all the aid you can give authorities is "no can do" - and that's still acceptable? I'm kind of fine with that.
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Anyway, if there's a product out there which doesn't provide this capability, no amount of bill passage is going to make that product work like some congressperson wants.
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"covered entities must provide responsive, intelligible information or data, or appropriate technical assistance to a goverment pursuant to a court order."
I assume that this includes secret FISA orders, but what's with the language about "a government"? Could this be construed to include non-American governments? (i.e. Five Eyes?) Or is that a term of art?
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> Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
If you've done anything illegal, they can't compel you to work?
Seems to make this whole thing sound unconstitutional.
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We must combat ignorance by educating the ignorant, and that includes elected officials. Many here at HN have knowledge and high level of awareness of the importance of privacy and security, and I'm sure there are more than a few genuine experts tuning in. In any case most of us probably have salient information and experience to share, and it certainly needs to be shared.
If you are a US citizen by all means write to your Representative and Senators. Voters' opinions do matter, particularly in an election year.
This afternoon, I sent messages to all 3 members of my congressional delegation exclaiming how bad an idea the Burr-Feinstein bill happens to be. I urge you do do the same.
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One of the major gripes of the American revolution was the forced quartering of soldiers in people's homes.
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So no more Hash functions I guess, better store those passwords in clear text. Also encryption is the key to any form of distributed system where you have misbehaving actors.., you know like the internet..
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(written on an rk3288-based ARM laptop from China, over a VPN from Iceland)
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Could someone explain what this would look like, in a practical sense? Would self-signed keys become illegal, and all PKI would have to have a "government" parent key of some kind?
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If not, then perhaps a lot of big US tech companies will move offshore?
Thoughts?
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The bill mandates technical assistance, yes, but the obvious argument is that no amount of technical assistance can accomplish that which is impossible. If the data can't be accessed, it can't be accessed. Interpreting this as barring companies from implementing those implementing those features would require an unduly expansive reading of the text, to say nothing of issues with Sect. 3(b).
Sect. 3(c) seems to contradict that, but 18 USC Β§ 2711 defines a "remote computing service" as "the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system" [0]. That would seem to include iCloud services, for instance, but not the iPhone itself. For reference, 18 USC Chapter 121 covers the storage of electronic communications and access to transactional records.
It's possible that this is part of a long-game. Breaking the encryption debate down into smaller pieces lets them control the narrative a bit more and defuse some of the strongest arguments against backdoors and weakening encryption. They can point to this bill a few months down the road and see "look, nothing bad happened. The evil hackers those San Francisco techies were complaining about never stole your identity." It would make the opposition appear more reactionary, and give them more time to muddy the water further.
To the average person, the bill seems entirely reasonable. Who could object to companies giving assistance when they have to comply with a court order? In that sense, it's a perfect starting point.
But most likely, this is a trial balloon meant to help them refine their arguments and position before they get around to a concerted push. That seems likely given that the Senate Intelligence Committee doesn't really have jurisdiction over this issue [1][2]. If they can pass it, great for them. If not, they'll come back around for another go in a bit. They've got the time, and for various reasons, they've chosen this hill to fight upon.
If the want to stop these efforts before they eventually manage to stumble into a "success," the tech industry eventually has to gear up for a lobbying and PR war with a degree of cynicism that's unheard of in Silicon Valley. Eventually, simply reacting to the government's efforts isn't going to be enough.
Groups like the RIAA and MPAA, even when they've failed to actually implement their policy proposals, have had remarkable successes in manipulating Congress to go along with their plans. At least until they backfire. Like the NRA with the second amendment, encryption will have to be the primary focus. Everything else has to be secondary. Supporting backdoors and the weakening of encryption has to be transformed into a toxic issue for politicians. Hammer home the potential consequences to every retiree and everyone else who doesn't like the idea of their identity being stolen and their assets being spread amongst the criminal element.
With this debate, there's really no room for optimism or taking the "high road." There's no high road in sight, and success is the only metric that matters here.
0. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2711
1. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/burr-feinstein-proposa...
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It is the sense of Congress that--
no person or entity is above the law;
economic growth, prosperity, security, stability, and liberty require
adherence to the rule of law;
Confused here, I thought that the process between Apple and the FBI was taking place in the courts and not on some kind of aquatic platform in international waters.
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If encryption becomes widespread and providers/individuals start using it correctly, then it will greatly hinder law enforcement's ability to gather physical evidence for certain types of crimes.
At the end of the day this is just another situation where we have to weigh the positive of greater freedom against the negative of the impunity this freedom may provide to those breaking laws that we all support.
I don't know what the answer is, but acting like anyone who supports this legislation is just after more control is immature.
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I posted my full thoughts after the first reading through this at https://rietta.com/blog/2016/04/08/feinstein-burr-encryption....
Specifically, any U.S company would be required to maintain the ability, through unspecified means, to retrieve the plain-text from any data βmade unintelligible by a feature, product, or service owned, controlled, created, or provided by the [company].β And the company would then be required to turn over such data in real-time βconcurrently with its transmissionβ or βexpeditiously, if stored by the [company] or on a device.β
It's chilling.