(Replying to PARENT post)
The 737 Max is not an inherently unstable aircraft and to say so grossly misunderstands the term and what MCAS was doing.
MCAS existed to make an inherently stable aircraft handle in the same was as previous 737 generations. Design changes had forced the addition of this system in order to retain the same type rating because those design changes caused the aircraft to handle differently to previous generations.
MCAS was about keeping the same type rating and the same handling characteristics. It had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with 'inherent instability' - the 737 Max is an inherently stable aircraft without MCAS.
Continuing to spread misinformation about what MCAS is and the 737 Max stability is detrimental to the discussion.
EDIT - There is clearly a lot of misunderstand about the terms 'stable' and 'unstable'. These has a defined meaning in aircraft handling. I encourage you to educate yourselves on the term, on what stability actually is in relation to this discussion.
https://www.boldmethod.com/learn-to-fly/aerodynamics/3-types...
The 737 Max is a stable aircraft. The 737 Max without MCAS activated is a stable aircraft. It is an inherently stable design.
The 737 Max can and was flown without MCAS activated (even by the same aircraft as crashed, the pilots of the previous flight pulled the stabiliser cut out switches and went to manual trim control).
It is a stable aircraft.
(Replying to PARENT post)
> ... it's an example of what happens when MBA execs, convinced that they can run "any business" take over from a rigourous engineering culture. The Harvard (and other) Business Schools have a lot to be blamed for.
Don't hold your breath for anyone to held accountable, don't expect that business will learn a lesson from this.
(Replying to PARENT post)
Is this documented? Did MBAs from HBS flood the FAA? And how would that lead to a plane falling out of the sky?
I'm with you on the general gist of your comment with regards to HBS - but I'd be careful about starting a witch hunt.
(Replying to PARENT post)
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(Replying to PARENT post)
Yes, MCAS is a pernicious and deadly design.
Equally, Boeing's corporate governance and FAA's regulation and oversight are also "pernicious and deadly".
All must be fixed before this aircraft flies again.
(Replying to PARENT post)
From what I can tell flying is far too safe for its own good. Seriously:
Flying is regulated to ridiculous level of safety. At current levels, each marginal dollar spent on flight safety would do much better being spent on driving safety or more radically, preventing deaths from malaria.
If we apply unequal dollar amounts to how much we are willing to pay for each life saved in different areas of life, we are saving fewer lives than we could.
(Replying to PARENT post)
I've been around computers since well before it was called UX, and since UX? trust me, I never blame users, I definitely blame UX.
we need to bring back UI.
(Replying to PARENT post)
MCAS was an economics driven decision by Boeing to be able to sell it as a "no cost" upgrade to existing 737 fleets. "You get all this and you don't need to retrain your people"
The entire concept of the 737 MAX was flawed, marketing an inherently unstable aircraft with a patched undocumented system to control that instability. Then, incredibly, making the safety indicators an optional extra was criminal.
The FAA is also liable for regulatory capture and handing over its responsibilities the actual organization it is supposed to be supervising.
Ultimately, it's an example of what happens when MBA execs, convinced that they can run "any business" take over from a rigourous engineering culture. The Harvard (and other) Business Schools have a lot to be blamed for.