(Replying to PARENT post)

Intel sold off Xscale (nΓ©e StrongARM) just before the touchscreen smartphone boom started. Seems like they would have been well positioned to take the lead in this market. Probably Apple would have used an Xscale SOC for the iPhone if Intel had taken it seriously.

Strategic blunder of the century so far?

πŸ‘€pavlovπŸ•‘2yπŸ”Ό0πŸ—¨οΈ0

(Replying to PARENT post)

Xscale sale was announced 7 months before the iPhone was announced, but presumably way after work had started and Apple had asked Intel for a processor. A truly poor decision.

> There was just one problem: The PC era was about to end. Apple was already working on the iPhone, which would usher in the modern smartphone era. Intel turned down an opportunity to provide the processor for the iPhone, believing that Apple was unlikely to sell enough of them to justify the development costs.

https://www.vox.com/2016/4/20/11463818/intel-iphone-mobile-r...

πŸ‘€helsinkiandrewπŸ•‘2yπŸ”Ό0πŸ—¨οΈ0

(Replying to PARENT post)

It’s worse than that. Apple had just switched PPC to Intel, and Jobs approached Intel in 2005 to make the iPhone SoC.

From Paul Otellini exit interview in 2013

>"We ended up not winning it or passing on it, depending on how you want to view it. And the world would have been a lot different if we'd done it… The thing you have to remember is that this was before the iPhone was introduced and no one knew what the iPhone would do... At the end of the day, there was a chip that they were interested in that they wanted to pay a certain price for and not a nickel more and that price was below our forecasted cost. I couldn't see it. It wasn't one of these things you can make up on volume. And in hindsight, the forecasted cost was wrong and the volume was 100x what anyone thought.”

The title of the article is "Paul Otellini's Intel: Can the Company That Built the Future Survive It?” and that is still a good question a decade later.

https://archive.is/B0Bbs

πŸ‘€TradingPlacesπŸ•‘2yπŸ”Ό0πŸ—¨οΈ0

(Replying to PARENT post)

The biggest mistake of Paul Ottelini for sure. The world would look very, very different if he said yes.
πŸ‘€baqπŸ•‘2yπŸ”Ό0πŸ—¨οΈ0

(Replying to PARENT post)

Heh, I was at Intel in the late 90s when they were internally worried as heck of Transmeta (not in relation to LGBTQ or the company meta :-)

https://www.zdnet.com/article/arm-shares-tumble-as-transmeta...

in 1997 Intel was terrified of Transmeta, and it lit a fire under their ass to get the Celeron out more quickly...

Me and a colleague worked a F-ton to test out not only the Celeron, AGP, SIMD, OpenGL, Unreal Engine, and all the latest games...

But Intel paid the game devs a Million Marketing bucks if they would optimize their games (and general software) to the SIMD instructions, to make the game feel more subjectively responsive on the Celeron as opposed to the AMD, and the seemingly incoming Transmeta.

so I think that Transmeta was the big blunder, but in reverse ; ; Intel should have been all over gaming, and not been afraid of some plucky startup...

But recall all the senior engineers at intel from <1995 had slide rules and pocket protectors.... they didnt see the entertainment wave of computing early enough and made far too many mistakes and tried to catch up.... personally, I think Linux saved Intel from bankruptcy.

πŸ‘€samstaveπŸ•‘2yπŸ”Ό0πŸ—¨οΈ0

(Replying to PARENT post)

Blackberry phones peaked in 2009, there was plenty of time to reconsider. This is just blatant revisionism, there were plenty of on-ramp opportunities within the product timeline.

Apple didn't move off Samsung entirely until the A8, and they still rely on many Samsung hardware IPs within the SoC to this day. It was not just a fab arrangement from day 1. https://twitter.com/calebccff/status/1472517091970494465

Apple relied on many of the same suppliers as the rest of the industry for a very long time, except the ones they acquired and closed-off. Purely on a "rising tide lifts all boats basis", Intel would still have had access to the dominant player if the ARM-based touchscreen era wiped out the incumbents. However, this is still a very low-margin business, despite requiring more engineering effort than desktop.

You could argue that $1500 phones were unthinkable at the time, but as a commodity, chipset manufacturers see less than 5-10% percent of that, even on flagship phones.

πŸ‘€maven29πŸ•‘2yπŸ”Ό0πŸ—¨οΈ0

(Replying to PARENT post)

Intel actually designed a CPU for the iPhone. Apple didn't use it because it failed to meet their performance/thermal requirements. Intel was not happy about this.
πŸ‘€anecdotal1πŸ•‘2yπŸ”Ό0πŸ—¨οΈ0

(Replying to PARENT post)

Intel doesn't invest in anything besides x86. They let XScale languish while they owned it and even if the iPhone used XScale, Intel still would have found a reason to under-invest in it.
πŸ‘€wmfπŸ•‘2yπŸ”Ό0πŸ—¨οΈ0

(Replying to PARENT post)

But Intel did respond with x86 SoCs for smartphones. Merrifield, Moorefield and Airmont.
πŸ‘€DeathArrowπŸ•‘2yπŸ”Ό0πŸ—¨οΈ0

(Replying to PARENT post)

To me this seems to be an attempt to leverage their dominant position at the time to further strengthen it, and eventually failing to strong-arm the industry.
πŸ‘€omneityπŸ•‘2yπŸ”Ό0πŸ—¨οΈ0

(Replying to PARENT post)

Xscale didn't have a GPU built into the SoC.
πŸ‘€rjswπŸ•‘2yπŸ”Ό0πŸ—¨οΈ0

(Replying to PARENT post)

It only cost Otellini his cushy job
πŸ‘€oblakπŸ•‘2yπŸ”Ό0πŸ—¨οΈ0

(Replying to PARENT post)

Non-touchscreen smartphone boom been going for years prior.

The problem was that embedded OS-es like Symbian, A200, PalmOS were running circles around Windows Mobile. Most of them used Samsung SoCs which were few times slower than StrongARM.

StrongARM was seen exclusively in the context of it being used to "lift" extremely bloated WinMo smartphones, and was otherwise thought as an overkill for other uses.

πŸ‘€baybal2πŸ•‘2yπŸ”Ό0πŸ—¨οΈ0