Spying on a smartphone remotely by the authorities: feasibility and operation
(security.stackexchange.com)(Replying to PARENT post)
Is there a way to set up a phone so that typing a "special" password puts the phone in an alternate state with different apps and content, etc. (and possibly erase the regular content)?
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> French police should be able to spy on suspects by remotely activating the camera, microphone and GPS of their phones and other devices, lawmakers agreed late on Wednesday, July 5.
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/07/06/france-s...
Why would anyone stir up the civil libertarians if the thing you are making legal is not possible?
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This is a question with one short answer (at the time of my comment). It's hard to imagine why it made the top on its own merits.
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Would the cell phone manufacturers (Apple, Samsung, Motorola, Nokia, Xiaomi, etc) say no when faced with the possibility of losing market share in France. Because of a law pushed through under the cover of security. Many a liberties have slipped under that blanket cover called security.
I think they will put in this feature if it's not already there.
(Replying to PARENT post)
That probably doesn't surprise others. What isn't as known is that the government also intrudes into chats with other people on social media.
They don't just monitor, but actively interfere.
Edit: By the way, Nokias and other dumbphones (without physical off-switches -- the PinePhone has them, but good luck getting one) can also get their mic and GPS remotely activated. The partial solution is to get one with a removable battery and remove the battery whenever not in use.
iPhones can be hacked into through IMEI if you connect them, but are useful, encrypted offline-only PDAs if you don't install any app.
Also, if your electronics are being spied on by the government to this degree, chances are you are also being physically monitored.
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https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/07/06/france-s...
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BUT sophisticated attackers like US or Israeli governments (and I assume Russian or Chinese but I donโt have direct experience with these) donโt need these backdoors, getting anywhere near your phone is enough to root it to allow installation of spyware, according to my CSO who worked in naval intelligence. There are simply too many vulnerabilities for there to be a hardened device in the consumer space. Some are better than others (Apple) but as Bruce Schneier says, if you are worried about this sort of thing you really have to be totally disconnected from the internet and exchange encrypted physical media.
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One doesn't need to do any shady stuff with baseband or stockpile on zero day vulns.
The current mobile ecosystem is such that any supported device (recieving updates and such) sends its unique identifier to the manufacturer before recieving OTA updates. And devices by default check for updates on a regular bases. Basically the manufacturer can always target and track individual devices. And provision indivisualised signed updates. Not just at the country level but targeted to specific IMEI.
Coming to more concrete examples, Google is known to do AB testing with their Pixel line of devices, setting custom profiles for some users.
Xiomi had previously shown capability to actively disable devices that move outside of legal sale regions.
Samsung uses such capabilities for enterprise devices in Samsung's Enterprise/Knox platform. And consumer devices can be thought of as enterprise devices under the manufacturers domain.
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So the government only simply needs to send these companies warrants to target, bug and track specific devices or registered customers.
Online platforms are already subjected to data requests from law enforcement which they must conform to (atleast those with supporting warrant).
Some try to recuse themselves from such compelled intrusion of their customers by employing end to end encryption (e2ee).
With this provision and manufacturer cooperation, they could get direct full control of the ends (personal devices). Obviating the need to "break" encryption.
Why deal with a dizzying cloud of services in wide range of jurisdictions when you can have full access to citizen devices with cooperation of a handful of manufacturers.
In summary, this is not just feasible, the elements for an organised remote control system are already present in current smartphone ecosystem. In form of signed updates by manufacturers that can target particular IMEI devices. One just needs this law to wade through the legality issues.
A solution to avoid such sweeping surveillance capability would be to convince manufacturers to not receive identifiable data before provisioning updates. And have a public ledger of officially signed image hashes, like those of of domain certificate transparency lists.
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Source: I was once a CALEA programmer.
Anyone who says otherwise is an idiot, a liar, or both.
Web sites that are frequently referenced are forced to censor the truth.
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